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1. Introduction 
For the marketing of a product, traditional marketing channel theory distin­
guishes different parallel flows within a distribution channel (Mallen 1977). 
One can, for instance, distinguish the flows of: 
physical goods, 
information, 
title. 
The physical flow of products is the subject of physical distribution and supply 
chain research. This paper concentrates on the flow of title within the market­
ing channel. The chain consisting of consecutive title transfers could be defined 
as the transaction chain or trade chain. Transaction chains involving the same 
product and the same trading partners can still differ as to the transaction type 
and market conditions at any transaction stage. 
In the Dutch flower and pot-plant trade, both transaction and supply chains 
traditionally run through cooperative auctions. Most products are marketed 
through chains running from the producer via a wholesaler and a retailer to the 
consumer. The terms wholesaler and trader will be used alternately. Some 
70% of the trade between producers and wholesalers takes place at the auc­
tions. For price discovery, all auctions use auction clocks according to the 
Dutch auction system. A concentration of wholesalers and retailers tends to 
weaken the price discovery function of the auctions. The traditional role of the 
auction cooperative is shifting from a price discovery instrument towards an 
autonomous marketing institute (Meulenberg 1989). This trend has weakened 
the near-monopoly position of the auction clock as a trading mechanism. 
Nowadays, even the mere continuation of the auction clock is under serious 
discussion. Alternative market places in- and outside the cooperatives, where 
bilateral negotiation between producers and traders plays an important role, 
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have gained importance. Yet, the price discovery function of the clock seems 
to be of great relevance. 
The objective of this paper is twofold. Using recent data on the pot-plant trade 
from the United Flower Auctions Aalsmeer (VBA), the largest Dutch flower 
auction, the present role of the auction clock will be investigated. The focus is 
upon the relation between price formation as regulated by the auction clock 
and as regulated in alternative trading places. Furthermore, inferences are 
made about pricing behaviour at different stages in the transaction chain for 
pot-plants. 
2. Dual chain structure 
The most important trading place beside the auction floor is the broker's 
office, connected to the auction cooperative. Producers present samples of their 
products and state an asking price. Every week they restate the asking price, 
having the opportunity to adjust it to the prices of the competitors. Traders can 
order directly from the producer or through the agency of the broker's office. 
Although the broker's office price is fixed per producer during the week, the 
average price of the units traded through the broker's office can vary from day 
to day. When demand rises, traders may for instance develop a preference 
towards the more expensive, high quality products, whereas in a decreasing 
market, the less expensive products may become more popular. 
The broker's office used by both producers and traders has some advantages 
and disadvantages over the auction floor. Through brokerage, unlike the 
auction clock, producers can rest assured about the selling price, but they are 
uncertain whether they will sell all their stock. Through brokerage, traders can 
specify the desired amount, specify the product, ripeness, packaging and 
moment of delivery. Furthermore, producers and traders have the opportunity 
to enter into long term relationships, which have a stabilising effect on prices. 
On the other hand, the burden of direct negotiation and delivering on order is 
an insuperable impediment to many producers (Broens and Meulenberg 1996). 
Trade prices arranged through the broker's office are significantly higher than 
those realized on the auction clock. This might be due to quality differences or 
an unequal distribution of efficiencies over the trading parties. 
3. Horizontal price relations 
3.1. Hypothesis 
Different traders face different situations, and as a result have different 
preferences for the most attractive channel. Especially the large and powerful 
traders prefer the broker's office for regular trade. Yet, in general, both pro­
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ducers and traders use the auction clock for reference. Apparently it provides 
superior trade information. Furthermore, it is claimed that trade shifts from the 
broker's office to the clock when clock prices go down. As a result, the 
broker's office prices should go down as well. Therefore it is conjectured that, 
for all products considered, the broker's office prices follow the auction clock 
prices. 
3.2. Granger causality test 
To test whether price movements in one market follow price movements in 
another, in the sense of time, the concept of Granger 'causality' (Gran­
ger 1969) can be applied. The Granger test of 'causality' implies testing the 
following two hypotheses: 
The price of product x in the broker's office does not follow the 
price of product x on the clock or: If the broker's price is 
explained by past broker's prices, past clock prices do not add to 
this explanation (H0). 
The price of product x on the clock does not follow the price of 
product x in the broker's office or: If the clock price is explained 
by past clock prices, past broker's prices do not add to this expla­
nation (H,). 
If H0 is rejected, and H, is not, then the broker's office price is supposed to 
follow the clock price. If Hj is rejected, and H0 is not, then the clock price is 
supposed to follow the broker's office price. If neither one of them or both are 
rejected, the test is inconclusive. To test these hypotheses for every product 
separately, a two-step approach is chosen. 
In the first step, ARMA models of the following form are estimated for every 
product separately: 
Pb* = Pw + EL at Pc,t-i+ EL P/ Pb,t-i+ eb,t 
(1) 
Pc,t = Pco + Ef=! Y; Pc,t-i + Ef=i Ô> Pb,t-i + ec,r 
where et is a normally distributed error term with expected value 0, and pc t 
and pit are the daily average prices on day t of the product under consideration 
on the clock and in the broker's office, respectively. The hypotheses translate 
to: 
Hq . ffj — •. • — tfcp — 0 
H,: = ... = ôT = 0 
Both hypotheses are tested using the relevant F-statistic value. The value of T 
can be varied. Normally, the higher the value of T, the more reliable the 
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conclusions. Conclusions which are consistent over a complete range of T are 
of course most robust. 
In the second step a refinement is made by applying error-correction models 
for the prices in both markets, using the Engle-Granger procedure (Engle and 
Granger 1987). The error-correction model is defined as: 
APb,t = abo + HAPc-i + ab2^Pk,t-x - ßfcVi + e 
(2) 
^Pct = «co + a c I APc,t-l + "c2^Pb,t-1 - ßcVl + e,,( 
The 'error' term fjt is the ordinary least squares estimate of the error in the 
'long term' price relation: 
Pbf = Y0 + YiPc, + 1» (3) 
T-tests are applied to the estimated values of ßb and ßc. If the hypothesis 
A = o is not rejected, but ßb = 0 is, the auction clock price is weakly 
exogeneous and the broker's office price is not. If, in addition, the hypothesis 
ac2 = 0 is not rejected either, the broker's office price can be concluded to be 
'caused', in the Granger sense, by the clock price. 
3.3. Test results 
To test the hypotheses, trade data from the VBA are used. The data consist of 
the daily average prices of many products over the period January 1 1993 to 
June 23 1995, both clock prices and broker's office prices. The analysis is 
restricted to 8 different products, which are listed in Table I, and to the prime 
quality class. 
The hypotheses are tested according to the two-step procedure described 
above. The Granger causality test values of the ARMA model (1), repeated for 
the values T = 1, T = 5 and T = 10 are given in Table I. 
In the model with one lag, for most pot-plants both hypotheses are rejected. 
For the larger Kalanchoe however, both hypotheses are accepted. For both 
sizes of the Cyclamen, Granger causality is indicated: the broker's office 
seems to follow the auction clock price in the short run. 
If time lags up to five working days (i.e. one working week) are included in 
the ARMA model, a totally different picture arises. For the larger Kalanchoe 
and the smaller Begonia, the tests are indecisive. For both Saintpaulias, the 
smaller Kalanchoe and the larger Begonia (the most important trading items), 
the broker's office follows the clock price. This is no surprise, because most 
growers set their broker's office prices as a function of auction clock prices 
from the week before. However, for both Cyclamen the clock price now seems 
to follow the broker's office. There is no obvious explanation for this result. 
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Table I Granger causality test values, model (1) 
Product Pot size F-statistic value (p-value) 
1 lag 5 lags 10 lags 
Saintpaulia 9 cm H„ 5.146 (.0238) .511 (.7680) .723 (.7009) 
H, 77.865 (.0000) 4.021 (.0017) 2.455 (.0114) 
12 cm H„ 13.860 (.0002) 1.049 (.3883) 1.914 (.0415) 
H, 54.137 (.0000) 2.746 (.0184) 2.633 (.0040) 
Kalanchoe 10 cm H0 5.205 (.0229) 1.581 (.1635) 1.515 (.1308) 
H, 73.645 (.0006) 7.741 (.0000) 6.620 (.0000) 
12 cm H„ .039 (.8443) .511 (.7680) .248 (.9904) 
H, 2.954 (.0861) 1.437 (.2112) 1.634 (.1042) 
Begonia 9 cm H0 7.004 (.0086) 1.787 (.1269) .585 (.7727) 
H, 47.263 (.0000) .556 (.7329) 1.167 (.3907) 
13 cm H„ 8.362 (.0040) 1.249 (.2847) 1.562 (.1145) 
H, 110.06 (.0000) 9.560 (.0000) 4.687 (.0000) 
Cyclamen 10 cm H0 .215 (.6434) 4.067 (.0097) 2.080 (.1774) 
H, 16.533 (.0001) 1.585 (.2078) 4.129 (.0405) 
12 cm H0 .634 (.4230) 3.468 (.0046) 2.244 (.0162) 
H, 23.445 (.0000) 1.859 (.1012) .883 (.5500) 
If the explanatory power of the model is increased by inserting more lags, up 
to two weeks or ten working days, the picture changes only slightly from the 
one-week model. That is, all results remain unchanged, apart from the fact that 
the direction of the Granger causality is reversed for the smaller Cyclamen. 
The results of these tests as to the relation between both markets in the short 
run, on the basis of the model with a one-day lag, show no clear indications. 
A more refined way to analyse short run relations is by applying an error-
correction model, the second step of our model. For all products, except the 
smaller Cyclamen, the 'long term' price relation (3) is cointegrated (Versant-
voort 1995). The coefficient values of the error-correction model (2), relating 
the short term dynamics in both price series, are given in Table II, along with 
their t-statistic values. 
For all products, except the larger Saintpaulia and Begonia, the clock price is 
weakly exogeneous, the broker's office price is not weakly exogeneous, and 
the hypothesis ac2 = 0 is not rejected. For these products, the Granger 
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causality is assumed: the broker's office price movements follow clock price 
movements. For the larger Saintpaulia and Begonia, this test is indecisive. 
Table II Error-correction model coefficients for different products 
Product Pot size Coefficient estimate (t-statistic) 
a.j 0!«2 ß* 
Saintpaulia 9 cm b -.0564 (-1.79) -.382 (-8.63) -.287 (-7.12) 
c -.244 (-5.20) -.0439 (-.755) .095 (1.63) 
12 cm b -.0362 (-1.57) -.323 (-8.31) -.378 (-9.27) 
c -.334 (-8.42) -.129 (-1.92) .193 (2.74) 
Kalanchoe 10 cm b .0027 (.201) .113 (2.13) -1.09 (-12.6) 
c -.542 (-9.93) -.0211 (-.109) .0005 (.002) 
12 cm b -.0421 (-.505) -.0983 (-1.97) -.704 (-11.2) 
c -.402 (-.330) .00836 (.330) -.005 (-.154) 
Begonia 9 cm b .0041 (.120) -.308 (-8.04) -.338 (-9.12) 
c -.302 (-7.41) -.0121 (-.261) .0331 (.749) 
13 cm b -.100 (-2.90) -.146 (-3.62) -.631 (-13.0) 
c -.301 (-7.24) -.122 (-2.55) .136 (2.35) 
Cyclamen 10 cm b .181 (1.99) -.0124 (-.199) -.228 (-4.51) 
c -.0715 (-.948) -.0022 (-.045) -.014 (-.365) 
12 cm b -.0778 (-1.65) -.119 (-2.40) -.877 (-12.8) 
c -.398 (-8.54) -.0040 (-.083) -.026 (-.380) 
3.4. Conclusion 
The straight ARMA model (1) is greatly indecisive about the short term 
interdependencies. If lags up to two weeks are included, the model then 
indicates a causal relation, in the Granger sense, for five of the eight products: 
the broker's office prices follow the auction clock prices, and not the other 
way around. For two products, the tests are indecisive, and for one product, 
the larger Cyclamen, causality is indicated, but in the counterintuitive direc­
tion. 
A second test on short term dynamics, involving the error-correction model 
(2), showed that, for six out of eight products, broker's office prices follow 
the clock prices in the short term as well. 
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Apparently, both in the short and in the long run, broker's office prices largely 
follow clock prices. This may indicate that nowadays, the auction clock still 
offers superior market information to both producers and traders. The price 
discovery function of the auction clock is still very important. 
4. Vertical price relations 
4.1. Wholesalers' versus retailers' pricing behaviour 
Most wholesalers who buy pot-plants at the auction clock prices, bill their 
clients a fixed percentage above purchase price. Oddly enough, their interests 
are the same as the producer's. They would be gladly willing to pay more for 
the product, provided that their direct competitors did the same. It is particu­
larly the price competition among the wholesalers which determines price 
volatility. 
For an individual wholesaler with a fixed mark-up percentage, facing a fixed 
demand curve, optimal revenue is attained at exactly the same price and 
quantity that marks the revenue optimum to his supplier. 
For the wholesale sector as a whole, the optimum can be different from that of 
the producers as a whole. Recent research on the price behaviour of Dutch 
flower exporters (van Dalen and Thurik 1995) indicates that both demand 
elasticities and the margin policy of Dutch wholesalers differ among different 
export markets. If the bidding and pricing behaviour of wholesalers in one 
market is homogenous and independent of the bidding behaviour of wholesalers 
in other markets, they can be considered separately. Then the overall whole­
sale optimum is equal to the overall producers' optimum. But if the bidding 
behaviour of different markets is interdependent, for instance because different 
markets compete for the same restricted amount of produce, it is easy to 
deduce that the overall wholesale pricing optimum is different from the overall 
producers' optimum. It depends on the different demand elasticities and the 
margin policies in the different markets, whether the wholesalers' bids will be 
too low or too high. Further research is needed on this point. 
Retailers are known not to stick to fixed percentage margins. Retail prices are 
less flexible than wholesale prices (Veltman and La Crois 1992). For an 
isolated transaction chain, this means that the optimal trade level to the retailer 
is higher, and the trade price lower than is optimal for both the fixed-percen­
tage mark-up wholesaler and for the producer. Direct negotiation through the 
broker's office would lead to a compromised deal. It is not clear how far this 
difference of interest influences the prices on the clock: prices are set through 
a horizontal coordination mechanism. Furthermore, in the preceding section it 
was shown that the broker's office process follows the clock prices, and not 
vice versa. Yet, on the clock, some retail chains give their wholesaler's price 
ceilings', they order an amount of produce, with some freedom as to the 
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moment of delivery and the product specification, but with a clear ceiling to 
the price it should attain. 
4.2. Price elasticities at different levels in the transaction chain 
Whereas the last section considered transaction chains on a micro level, this 
section considers the sector level by comparing price elasticities at different 
levels of the chain. Unfortunately, there are no consistent results available 
about relations between prices at different transaction levels for the flower 
trade. Present evidence is rather fragmentary, so this leaves another opportun­
ity for future research. 
Both on the auction clock (Broens and Meulenberg 1994) as well as in the 
broker's office (Versantvoort 1995) pnceflexibilities, that is, percentage 
changes in daily average price as a result of a 1 % change in daily supply, are 
negative but well below 1 in absolute value for pot-plants. Since supply is 
fixed per day, and usually the entire supply is used up, the daily average price 
is the main indicator of demand. There is no clear cut relation between price 
flexibilities in both market places. Although the translation to price elasticities 
of demand is not straightforward, the small absolute values of price flexibilities 
are an indication that demand at auction level is very price elastic. 
A recent cross-sectional study on the price behaviour of Dutch flower 
exporters (van Dalen and Thurik 1995) used annual figures. The price elastic­
ity of demand for wholesale services, defined as the percentage change of 
annual volume traded resulting from a 1% change in the annual average 
wholesale margin, is estimated to be about -1.2. The price elasticity of retailer 
demand for flowers and plants then depends on the assumptions on the relation 
between the wholesalers' purchasing and selling price. If there is no relation at 
all, the price elasticity of retailer demand is some -6.5, which is very extreme. 
If the wholesalers' selling price is assumed to be a fixed mark-up percentage 
above the purchasing price, and the mark-up percentage is assumed constant to 
all wholesalers, price elasticity of retailer demand is about -0.9 (average mark­
up is about 33%). Yet, since mark-up percentages differ over companies 
depending on the market served and the service delivered (van Dalen and 
Thurik 1995), this price elasticity might be expected to be well below -1. 
Finally, consumer research in the past has indicated that the price elasticity of 
consumer demand for both flowers and pot-plants in the Netherlands varies 
around -1 (van Tilburg 1984, Tap and van Gaasbeek 1985). 
Although the data can hardly be compared as to the period of investigation, the 
time base or the models used, some conjectures can be formulated. It seems 
that the retailer does not primarily buy flowers or plants from the wholesaler, 
but, instead, he buys wholesale services. Price competition among the whole­
salers leads to a bidding behaviour at auction level which is only slightly 
influenced by the quantity supplied. 
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5. Conclusion 
Data analysis shows that in the long run prices in the broker's office follow 
the prices on the auction clock. The role of the auction clock as a price 
discovery instrument is apparently still very strong, despite the large volume 
traded through other trade channels bypassing the clock. 
Despite the consistently higher prices in the broker's office, the bidding 
behaviour of the traders in the broker's office and on the clock, expressed by 
the price flexibilities, seems to be comparable in both trading places. The 
higher prices in the broker's office might be an indication of transaction cost 
savings on the part of the traders. Yet, referring to the price discovery 
function of the auction clock, it is to be doubted if all transaction cost savings 
would be available in the absence of an auction clock. Apparently, both trading 
places are co-dependent. The price discovery function of the auction clock in 
particular requires a minimum quotum of trade through the clock. 
There is no consistent difference in price flexibility of wholesalers' demand on 
the auction clock and in the broker's office. It seems that in an absolute sense, 
price elasticities decrease, along the path from producer to consumer. 
Objects for future research can be pointed out. The relation between price 
formation in the trading places will be further detailed by distinguishing 
different relations for specific situations. A model of the traders' bidding 
behaviour, including cost aspects, may indicate a proper hypotheses and a 
research approach for investigating vertical price relations. 
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